Hurricane Katrina: Analyzing the Damage and Environmental Injustices Fifteen Years Later

Contributors: Niya Khanjar

On August 29th, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the coast of Louisiana as what is now considered one of the most destructive hurricanes in American history.1 With winds of over 120 miles per hour, Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 hurricane, affecting nearly 92,000 miles of the Gulf Coast.2 New Orleans was at high risk, as much of the city is built below sea level, resulting in a large levee system implemented by the Army Corps or Engineers protecting the city from frequent flooding. These levees were built to prevent flooding from all of the major waterways around the city, including the Mississippi River and several lakes. The 9 meter storm surge that terrorized the city uprooted many of these levees entirely, and those that remained standing flooded over within the first day of the storm.1 The damage that ensued took the lives of approximately 1,800 people, displaced over 800,000 people, and resulted in upwards of $81 billion in damage costs.3

Figure 1: An overhead view of Hurricane Katrina. (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hurricane_Katrina_shortly_after_landfall_(20471874261).jpg)

The environmental effects of Hurricane Katrina were extensive, between the storm itself and the nature of the cleanup process following its conclusion. Some of the many casualties of Hurricane Katrina were the oil refineries in the area.4 Oil spills from three different refineries resulted in nearly 8 million gallons of oil spilled into local waterways, further endangering the local ecosystems. The 2005 hurricane season damaged a total of 457 pipelines and 113 offshore drilling platforms. The increasing expansion of the oil drilling industry in Louisiana is also thought to have contributed to the devastating effects of the storm in general, as infrastructure necessary for the oil industry weakens natural coastlines, allowing for more dangerous storm surges.4

In the aftermath of the hurricane, damaged buildings were destroyed entirely by large machines in an effort to clear extensively damaged areas for new development. This process, called deconstruction, resulted in the quick filling of already limited landfill space in New Orleans, and resulted in the EPA lifting landfill restrictions to reopen several environmentally hazardous locations.5 Additionally, the destruction of habitats across the Gulf coast was an unfortunate consequence of Hurricane Katrina. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that over 100 square miles of marsh in southern Louisiana is now open water as a result of the 2005 hurricane season, displacing the fragile ecosystems of the wetlands.6 Additionally, large numbers of exotic pets and fish were released in the aftermath of the disaster, resulting in unnatural species being incorporated into the local ecosystems. This can be extremely damaging to the native species of plants and animals.

Figure 2: Displays the aftermath of an oil spill as a result of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.

Figure 3: Displays the process of deconstruction, in which houses are destroyed and the remains fill local landfills. (Sources: https://pixnio.com/events-happenings/oil-spill-cleanup-programs-to-assist-lebanon-workers-to-contain-and-remove-spilled-oil; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Damage_to_Lower_Ninth_Ward_after_Hurricane_Katrina.jpg)

In preparation for Hurricane Katrina and in line with recommendations from leading weather experts, Louisiana called a state of emergency on August 26th, followed by a voluntary evacuation order by the mayor of New Orleans.7 The voluntary order became mandatory on August 28th, but with a large percentage of the population without a mode of transportation out of the city, the Superdome was opened as an alternative evacuation site.

Controversy raged over the federal response to the disaster in the months and years that followed, with many Americans believing that the damage was enhanced in part by the failure of federal agencies to provide effective aid to the areas in need.8 A combination of actions by Congress, the Bush Administration and the Federal Emergency Response Agency (FEMA) resulted in slow response times and inadequate preparation. Several reasons for this less than proactive response include communication failure, supply failure, and indecision between government agencies in charge of making important response decisions. An order by FEMA for all emergency services to receive state sanctioned approval before responding to areas hit by the hurricane resulted in slow response times.7 Restrictions to aid offered by the Red Cross also hindered the ability of the damaged areas to rebound effectively. Overall, the government response to the disaster contributed to the extensive damage done by the storm and the extended time it took for many areas to begin recovering.

Figure 4

Figure 5: Figures 4 and 5 display damages experienced by New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, including extensive flooding and property damage. (Sources: https://www.pickpik.com/hurricane-katrina-flooding-new-orleans-after-hurricane-katrina-damage-devastation-155235; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:New_Orleans_-_Hurricane_Katrina_aftermath_-_March_2006_-_19.jpg)

In addition to the poor response to Katrina’s recovery efforts by the federal government, environmental justice issues played a large role in the disparities in both damages and recovery resources between communities. As explained in a 2006 study, race and ethnicity put many residents of the affected areas at a disadvantage, as trends of Black populations being disproportionately in low-wealth neighborhoods with poor housing stock.9 These neighborhoods are often located in areas more vulnerable to damage from natural disasters, such as below sea level in New Orleans, in comparison to more climate resilient communities that tend to have better infrastructure, higher incomes, and less people of color.

As stated previously, many Black residents in New Orleans were living below the poverty line, resulting in a lack of resources to handle events such as Hurricane Katrina. As a consequence, low-wealth communities experienced more damage. For example, 57% of damaged households within the flood zones and 65% of damaged households outside of the designated flood zones were earning less than the median household income for the US. The unfortunate timing of the storm at the end of the month also meant that those receiving government aid were especially low on money.10 Although the city of New Orleans called for mandatory evacuation, many low-wealth residents had no mode of transportation out of the city, immediately putting them at higher risk from the effects of the storm.11 Damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina disproportionately affected communities of color, as seen in the relatively low amounts of flood damage experienced by the areas historically home to the plantations of the region.12 These areas benefited from higher elevation, less industrial development, and had adequate urban architecture. Demographic analysis of these areas determined that large percentages of communities less affected by flooding were predominantly White, with many sections recorded as being 0% African-American, a stunning example of modern-day racial segregation.12 Additionally, a 2011 study determined that 93% of those stranded in the days following the storm were Black.10

Damage wasn’t the only part of the disaster that disproportionately affected low income communities of color. Local and federal government response, while questionable in general, also disadvantaged low income communities of color from getting adequate assistance. In the days leading up to the hurricane, Mayor Nagin of New Orleans sent empty Amtrak trains out of the city, despite the thousands of New Orleans residents who lacked transportation to evacuate.10 Those left stranded in the city were evacuated to the Superdome stadium, where they faced disgusting conditions including lack of adequate food and water. During this time 6 people lost their lives, including 1 via suicide. In the months following the hurricane, a study was done to survey the opinions on federal aid on the basis of racial bias (Figure 6).13 It was determined that 77% of Black survivors believed the federal response to be poor, while only 55% of White survivors agreed.13 An even larger disparity was present when asked if the government’s response would’ve been faster if the communities most heavily affected were primarily White. While 66% of Black survivors agreed with this statement, only 17% of White survivor’s felt similarly.13

Table 1: Survey results regarding disparities in government relief after Hurricane Katrina on the basis of race. (Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/27/remembering-katrina-wide-racial-divide-over-governments-response/)

Table 2: Hurricanes in the United States since Katrina

In the years following the storm, the United States has endured numerous hurricanes, though none have been quite as devastating as Katrina in both damage and loss of life. Following the poor response from the federal government after Katrina and the numerous environmental injustices that were highlighted by that tragedy, there was an expectation for the national response to hurricanes to improve. It has been displayed time and time again through the impacts of recent storms on the most vulnerable that there has not been improvement or lessons learned.

Hurricane Sandy devastated much of the east coast of the United States in 2012, 7 years after Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, and yet the trends of disproportionate effects are the same. A study published in 2020 found that there was a correlation between higher median household income and less flood damage in New York City.33 Other vulnerable populations including the aging were more heavily impacted by flooding experienced in New York. Spatial analysis of the neighborhoods discussed in this study determined that the areas more heavily affected were densely populated with low income residents, and that these neighborhoods were located in low-lying, exposed areas that made them vulnerable to flooding.33

Figure 7: Overhead satellite view of Hurricane Sandy (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Suomi_NPP_Satellite_Captures_Detailed_Imagery_of_Hurricane_Sandy_Intensification_(8124932809).png)

Figure 8: Flooding in a NYC subway tunnel following Hurricane Sandy. (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pump_Train_in_Cranberry_Street_Tunnel_after_Hurricane_Sandy_vc.jpg)

The 2017 hurricane season was particularly devastating. In August, Hurricane Harvey hit the Texas coast, resulting in $125 billion in damage and 103 deaths. Although the death count was far lower than that of Katrina, Harvey was not free of the various environmental injustices seen in New Orleans. A 2019 study found that neighborhoods that endured the most flooding had a majority of Black and Hispanic residents.34 This trend is similar to what was seen in New York during Hurricane Sandy, as these communities are located in hazardous areas and are more vulnerable to natural disasters. Another 2019 study found that in addition to disproportionate effects of flooding, these communities of color are also more likely to be located near external environmental hazards, such as TRI facilities.35

These communities also had fewer opportunities to access healthcare than their wealthier, White counterparts, who were located far closer to a hospital on average.35 Furthermore, it was determined that Whiter communities were more likely to be rebuilt following the damage done by Hurricane Harvey, while communities of color were subject to gentrification or redevelopment.35

Figure 9: A satellite view of Hurricane Harvey. (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:As_expected_Harvey_has_intensified_into_a_Hurricane_(35973025253).jpg)

Figure 10: A disastrous chemical spill that was the result of Hurricane Harvey hitting a Valero facility in Texas. (Source: https://www.manufacturing.net/supply-chain/news/13118764/by-the-numbers-oil-and-chemical-spills-after-hurricane-harvey-vs-katrina)

In September of the same year, Hurricane Maria made landfall in several U.S. territories in the south Atlantic, namely Puerto Rico. The storm hit the islands as a category 4, and was the worst hurricane seen by that part of the world in 80 years.36 But, like nearly every other devastating hurricane, the effects were not felt uniformly across the areas hit. Although Puerto Rico as a whole has been negatively impacted by environmental injustice at the hands of the United States, inequalities exist within the territory itself as well. In the months following Maria, there were large disparities between recovery efforts seen in urban areas and those in rural areas. It was observed that when 80% of those in metropolitan areas had access to clean water again, only 45% of those in rural areas could say the same.36

Additionally, as in the United States, low income communities and communities of color are more likely to be located near environmental hazards in Puerto Rico. This has led to more exposure to dangerous emissions on a regular basis, but when these environmental hazards including sewage plants, coal mines, and TRI facilities are damaged in storms such as Hurricane Maria, the nearby communities are exposed to higher levels of contaminants than usual.36 There are 18 active Superfund sites in Puerto Rico, which heavily contributed to contamination of drinking water following Hurricane Maria, specifically emitting chlorinated volatile organic compounds, heavy metals, and pesticides.37 Finally, Puerto Rico experienced injustices in the aid received from the United States government. When compared to aid received by continental states such as Texas following Hurricane Harvey, the aid given to Puerto Rico was extremely slow and lacked adequate resources. A specific example is the 1,700 personnel deployed to Puerto Rico for hurricane relief compared to the 2,600 sent to the Gulf coast following Hurricane Harvey.36

Figure 11: A satellite view of Hurricane Maria. (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hurricane_Maria_2017_09_20_(37178284932).jpg)

Figure 12: The extensive damage experienced by Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria. (Source: https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-climate-change-affects-extreme-weather-around-the-world/damage-caused-by-hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-september-2017)

Following a similar trend, Hurricane Florence highlighted several environmental injustices when it hit the Carolinas in 2018. North and South Carolina are home to numerous industrial farming operations, but hog farming is a prominent industry in those states.38 Hog feces is stored in large pits called lagoons, and have a series of precautions to ensure no feces leaks into the surrounding environment. However, with the excessive rainfall (9 trillion gallons of rain39) brought by Hurricane Florence, several of these lagoons suffered from structural damage, resulting in an overflow of hog feces into the surrounding ecosystems. This has the potential to contaminate water sources and increase exposure of the surrounding communities to antibiotic-resistant bacteria and diseases carried in the hog feces. Several studies regarding the spatial location of industrial hog farms in the Carolinas have determined that low income communities of color are disproportionately located near these farms.40,41 This suggests that these vulnerable communities were more seriously affected by the consequences of exposure to hog waste than wealthier, Whiter communities in the state.

Figure 13: A satellite view of Hurricane Florence. (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NASA-NOAA%27s_Suomi_NPP_Observes_Hurricane_Florence_in_Infrared_(29681097817).png)

Figure 14: Displays a hog farm lagoon that has overflowed as a result of excessive rainfall during Hurricane Florence.

Figure 15: Displays the aftermath of extensive flooding of hog farms in North Carolina. (Sources: https://www.nrdc.org/stories/hurricane-flooded-hog-farms-could-bring-superbugs-north-carolina-communities; https://qz.com/1395700/hurricane-florence-drowns-3-4-million-poultry-birds-and-5500-pigs-in-north-carolina/)

It is clear that the United States has much to improve in regards to its hurricane recovery practices. Between the lackluster response during Hurricane Katrina and the continued patterns into other major hurricanes in the last 15 years, there must be a shift towards prioritizing the welfare of all people during these disasters. Furthermore, endangerment of entire communities as a result of faulty engineering is unacceptable, such as the levee failure in New Orleans. Going forward, there are several recommendations for improvements for hurricane policies and practices to ensure the American people are protected and protected equally.42

• Prevention as the preferred public health strategy42
• Redress disproportionate impact through targeted action and resources43
• Use systematic and thorough research to uncover inequality in exposure to hazard and risks and to support policy changes that reduce risk and suffering
• Utilize vulnerability analysis to help disaster relief become more historically and geographically informed
• Require in all National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for sewage treatment plants that are vulnerable to extreme weather to have backup power through generators to ensure that sewage treatment continues during and after a severe weather event44
• Ensure the availability and affordability of flood insurance
• Establish nationwide standards for levees, including frequent quality checks to ensure safety does not diminish over time
• Ensure policies for hurricane response and flooding are updated as information changes
• Strictly enforce building codes and land use regulations45
• Combat historical redlining in ways such as implementing Environmental Benefit Districts (EBDs)46
• Utilize all modes of public transportation to mobilize urban populations to safety when necessary
• Use all available resources (emergency response teams, Red Cross, etc.) to ensure fast and effective aid to those in need
• Invest in green energy, infrastructure, and policy to combat climate change
• Plan and implement post-disaster psychological care services for those who experienced trauma47

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